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Desde una perspectiva ontológica tradicional, y con 
la declarada intención de alejarse del relativismo 
contemporáneo, el presente escrito busca 
establecer algunos principios básicos para 
mantener la posición de la metafísica como el 
estudio sistemático de la realidad como un todo, y 
de la ontología como la ciencia del ser, sustentada en 
una teoría de categorías. Estas categorías están 
diferenciadas por las características distintivas de 
existencia e identidad de sus respectivos miembros, 
tomándose como «categorías ontológicas 
fundamentales» aquellas en donde sus miembros 
tienen condiciones para estas características de 
existencia e identidad que no sean especificables 
en una forma exhaustiva, en términos de 
dependencia ontológica, entre esos miembros y los 
miembros de otras categorías ontológicas. Este 
escrito hace entonces una revisión de las diferentes 
teorías de categorías ontológicas, y sus respectivas 
interpretaciones de cuántas y cuáles categorías 
deben ser reconocidas.  
 
 From a traditional ontological perspective, and with 
the declared intention to move away from 
contemporary relativism, this paper aims to 
establish some basic principles to maintain the 
position of Metaphysics as the systematic study of 
reality as a whole, and Ontology as the science of 
being, based on a theory of categories. These 
categories are differentiated by the distinctive 
features of existence and identity of their respective 
members, taking as «fundamental ontological 
categories» those where its members have 
conditions for these characteristics of existence and 
identity that are not exhaustively specifiable, in 
terms of ontological dependence, between those 
members and members of other ontological 
categories. This paper then makes a revision of the 
different theories of ontological categories, and 
their respective interpretations of how many and 
which categories should be recognized. 
Metafísica · Ontología · Teoría de categorías 
ontológicas · Existencia · Realidad. 
 Metaphysics · Ontology · Theory of ontological 
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§1. Philosophy, metaphysics and ontology 
HERE IS A WIDESPREAD ASSUMPTION AMONGST NON-PHILOSOPHERS, which 
is shared by a good many practising philosophers too, that «progress» is 
never really made in philosophy, and above all in metaphysics. In this 
respect, philosophy is often compared, for the most part unfavourably, with the 
empirical sciences, and especially the natural sciences, such as physics, 
chemistry and biology. Sometimes, philosophy is defended on the grounds that 
to deplore the lack of «progress» in it is to misconceive its central aim, which is 
challenge and criticise received ideas and assumptions rather than to advance 
positive theses. But this defence itself is liable to be attacked by the practitioners 
of other disciplines as unwarranted special pleading on the part of 
philosophers, whose comparative lack of expertise in other disciplines, it will be 
said, ill-equips them to play the role of all-purpose intellectual critic. It is 
sometimes even urged that philosophy is now «dead», the relic of a pre-
scientific age whose useful functions, such as they were, have been taken over at 
last by genuine sciences. What were once «philosophical» questions have now 
been transmuted, allegedly, into questions for more specialised modes of 
scientific inquiry, with their own distinctive methodological principles and 
theoretical foundations. 
This dismissive view of philosophy is at once shallow and pernicious. It is true 
that philosophy is not, properly speaking, an empirical science, but there are 
other disciplines of a non-empirical character in which progress most certainly 
can be and has been made, such as mathematics and logic. So there is no 
reason, in principle, why progress should not be made in philosophy. However, 
it must be acknowledged that even professional philosophers are in much less 
agreement amongst themselves as to the nature of their discipline and the 
proper methods of practising it than are mathematicians and logicians. There is 
more disagreement about fundamentals in philosophy than in any other area of 
T 
 




Edward J. Lowe | © 
Disputatio 4 (2014), pp. 89-112 
 
human thought. But this should not surprise us, since philosophy is precisely 
concerned with the most fundamental questions that can arise for the human 
intellect. 
The conception of philosophy that I favour is one which places metaphysics at 
the heart of philosophy and ontology –the science of being– at the heart of 
metaphysics.1 Why do we need a «science of being», and how is such a science 
possible? Why cannot each special science, be it empirical or a priori, address its 
own ontological questions on its own behalf, without recourse to any 
overarching «science of being»? The short answer to this question is that reality 
is one and truth indivisible. Each special science aims at truth, seeking to 
portray accurately some part of reality. But the various portrayals of different 
parts of reality must, if they are all to be true, fit together to make a portrait 
which can be true of reality as a whole. No special science can arrogate to itself 
the task of rendering mutually consistent the various partial portraits: that task 
can alone belong to an overarching science of being, that is, to ontology. But we 
should not be misled by this talk of «portraits» of reality. The proper concern of 
ontology is not the portraits we construct of it, but reality itself. 
Here, however, we encounter one of the great divides in philosophy, whose 
historical roots lie in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There are those 
philosophers –Kant is the most obvious and seminal figure– who consider that 
we cannot, in fact, know anything about reality «as it is in itself», so that 
ontology can be coherently conceived only as the science of our thought about 
being, rather than as the science of being as such. On the other hand, there are 
philosophers, many of whom would trace their allegiances back to Plato and 
Aristotle, who think that there is no obstacle in principle to our knowing at least 
something about reality as it is in itself. On behalf of this view, which I share, it 
may be urged that to deny the possibility of such knowledge is ultimately 
incoherent and self-defeating. The easiest way to sustain this charge is to point 
out that if, indeed, we could know nothing about reality as it is in itself, then for 
that very reason we could know nothing about our own thoughts about, or 
portrayals of, reality: for those thoughts or portrayals are nothing if not parts of 
reality themselves. In short, ontological questions –understood as questions 
about being rather than just about our thoughts about being– arise with regard 
to the ontological status of our thoughts, and of ourselves as thinkers of those 
thoughts: so that to attempt to recast all ontological questions as questions 
 
1 See further E. J. Lowe (1998) ch. 1, and (2002e), ch. 1, where many of the points made in the present section of 
this paper receive a fuller treatment. 
 
92 | Recent Advances in Metaphysics 
 
 
Edward J. Lowe | © 
Disputatio 4 (2014), pp. 89-112 
 
about our thoughts about what exists is to engender a regress which is clearly 
vicious. 
This still leaves unanswered the question of how we can attain knowledge of 
being, or of reality «as it is in itself», especially if ontology is conceived to be not 
an empirical but an a priori science. The answer that I favour divides the task of 
ontology into two parts, one which is wholly a priori and another which admits 
empirical elements. The a priori part is devoted to exploring the realm of 
metaphysical possibility, seeking to establish what kinds of things could exist 
and, more importantly, co-exist to make up a single possible world. The 
empirically conditioned part seeks to establish, on the basis of empirical 
evidence and informed by our most successful scientific theories, what kinds of 
things do exist in this, the actual world. But the two tasks are not independent: 
in particular, the second task depends upon the first. We are in no position to 
be able to judge what kinds of things actually do exist, even in the light of the 
most scientifically well-informed experience, unless we can effectively determine 
what kinds of things could exist, because empirical evidence can only be 
evidence for the existence of something whose existence is antecedently 
possible. 
This way of looking at ontological knowledge and its possibility demands that 
we accept, whether we like it or not, that such knowledge is fallible –not only 
our knowledge of what actually does exist, but also our knowledge of what could 
exist. In this respect, however, ontology is nowise different from any other 
intellectual discipline, including mathematics and logic. Indeed, it is arguable 
that it was the mistaken pursuit of certainty in metaphysics that led Kant and 
other philosophers in his tradition to abandon the conception of ontology as 
the science of being for a misconception of it as the science of our thought 
about being, the illusion being that we can attain a degree of certainty 
concerning the contents of our own thoughts which eludes us entirely 
concerning the true nature of reality «as it is in itself». 
 
§2. Ontological categories 
I have described ontology as being concerned, in its a priori part, with what 
kinds of things can exist and co-exist. By «kinds» here I mean categories, a term 
which is inherited, of course, from Aristotle, who wrote a treatise going under 
that title.2 (Later I shall be using the term «kinds» in a more restricted sense, to 
 
2 See Aristotle (1963). 
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denote one ontological category amongst others, so it is important that no 
confusion should arise on this score). And by «things» I mean entities, that is, 
beings, in the most general sense of that term. Category theory, then, lies at the 
heart of ontology –but, properly understood, concerns categories conceived as 
categories of being, not, in Kantian style, as categories of thought. (There is, of 
course, also a branch of mathematics called «category theory», but since 
ontology has the first claim on the term, I use it here without apology to the 
mathematicians concerned). 
Strangely, for much of the twentieth century, many philosophers, even those 
who were broadly sympathetic to the realist conception of ontology that I 
favour, saw no need for category theory to lie at the heart of metaphysics. This is 
because they imagined that all the purposes of ontology could be served, in 
effect, by set theory, perhaps in the belief that anything can be «modelled» in 
set theory and that any adequate model can be substituted, without loss, for 
whatever it is supposed to be a model of.3 Thus, for instance, they supposed that 
instead of talking about properties of objects, we could talk about sets of 
objects, or, more sophisticatedly, about functions from possible worlds 
(themselves conceived, perhaps, as sets of objects) to sets of objects «at» or «in» 
those worlds. For instance, the property of being red might be «represented» as 
a function which has, for each possible world as an argument, the set of red 
objects in that world as the corresponding value. And functions themselves, of 
course, are also ultimately «represented» as sets, namely, as sets of ordered pairs 
of their arguments and values (ordered pairs in turn being «represented» as sets 
of sets in the standard Wiener–Kuratowski fashion).  
Nothing could be more myopic and stultifying than this view that all the 
purposes of ontology can be served by set theory and set-theoretical 
constructions. Sets themselves comprise just one category of entities amongst 
many, and one which certainly could not be the sole category of entity existing 
in any possible world.4 Even if we suppose that so-called «pure» sets are possible 
–sets that have in their transitive closure only other sets, including the «empty» 
set– there must be more kinds of thing in any possible world than just such sets. 
This is true even if it is also true that anything whatever can, in some sense, be 
«modelled» set-theoretically. We should not conflate a model with what it is a 
model of. Indeed, there is a kind of unholy alliance between this way of doing 
ersatz ontology via set-theoretical constructions and the anti-realist conception 
 
3 For similar strictures, see B. Smith (1997, pp. 105-27), especially p. 107. 
4 See further E. J. Lowe (1998) ch. 12, and also (2002c, pp. 62-73). 
 
94 | Recent Advances in Metaphysics 
 
 
Edward J. Lowe | © 
Disputatio 4 (2014), pp. 89-112 
 
of ontology as the science of our thoughts about, or representations of, reality. 
What is common to both approaches is the misbegotten conviction that we must 
and can substitute, without significant loss, models or representations of things 
for the things themselves. 
So what, then, are ontological categories and which such categories should we 
acknowledge? How are such categories to be «individuated», that is, identified 
and distinguished? Here I shall make two preliminary claims, neither of them 
expressed very precisely at this stage. First, ontological categories are 
hierarchically organised and, second, ontological categories are individuated by 
the distinctive existence and/or identity conditions of their members. The two 
claims are mutually dependent, furthermore. I have already mentioned some 
ontological categories in passing: for instance, the categories of object, property 
and set. A hierarchical relation is observable even here, since sets comprise a 
sub-category of objects: that is to say, a set is a special kind of object –namely, it 
is an abstract object whose existence and identity depend entirely upon the 
existence and identities of its members. And thus we see here too how the 
category of set is individuated in terms of the existence and identity conditions 
of the entities that belong to it. (I hasten to emphasise that the sense in which 
an entity «belongs» to a category is not to be confused with the special set-
theoretical sense in which something is a «member» of a set: to indulge in this 
confusion would be to treat the categories themselves as sets, whereas in fact 
sets comprise just one ontological category amongst many. I should perhaps 
remark, indeed, that ontological categories are not themselves to be thought of 
as entities at all, nor, a fortiori, as comprising a distinctive ontological category of 
their own, the category of category. To insist, as I do, that ontological categories 
are categories of being, not categories of thought, is not to imply that these 
categories are themselves beings). 
As a further illustration of the foregoing points, consider the following two 
sub-categories of object, each of which is a special kind of concrete object, in 
contrast with such abstract objects as sets and propositions: masses, or material 
bodies, on the one hand, and living organisms on the other. Entities belonging to 
these two categories have quite different existence and identity conditions, 
because a living organism, being the kind of thing that is by its very nature 
capable of undergoing growth and metabolic processes, can survive a change of 
its constituent matter in a way that a mere mass of matter cannot. A mere mass, 
being nothing but an aggregate of material particles, cannot survive the loss or 
exchange of any of those particles, any more than a set can undergo a change of 
its members. As a consequence, it is impossible to identify a living organism with 
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the mass of matter which constitutes it at any given stage of its existence, for it is 
constituted by different masses at different stages.5  
It is a matter of debate how, precisely, ontological categories are hierarchically 
organised, although the top-most category must obviously be the most general 
of all, that of entity or being. Everything whatever that does or could exist may be 
categorised as an «entity». According to one view, which I favour myself, at the 
second-highest level of categorisation all  entities are divisible into either 
universals or particulars.6 A partial sketch of a categorial hierarchy embodying 
this idea and others that I have just outlined is provided in Fig. 1 below. I must 
emphasise its partial and provisional character. Other ontologists deny the very 
existence of universals, while yet others believe that all particulars are reducible 
to, or are wholly constituted by, coinstantiated or «compresent» universals. 
Already here we see a kind of question that is central to ontology: a question 
concerning whether one ontological category is more «fundamental» than 
another. Those ontologists who maintain that particulars are wholly constituted 
by coinstantiated universals are not denying –as some other ontologists do– the 
existence of either particulars or universals, but they are claiming that the 
category of universals is the more fundamental of the two. The point of such a 
claim is to effect an ontological economy. An ontologist who is never concerned 
to effect such economies is in danger of ending up with an ontological theory 
which amounts to nothing more than a big list of all the kinds of things that do 
or could exist: ships and shoes and sealing wax, cabbages and kings –not to 
forget dragons, witches, ectoplasm and the philosopher´s stone.7 
 
 
5 See further E. J. Lowe (1989) ch. 7. 
6 For an alternative view, see R. M. Chisholm (1996), or his (1992). 
7 Compare F. Jackson (1998), pp. 4-5. 
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Fig. 1: A fragment of the hierarchy of categories 
 
§3. Some competing ontological systems 
This is where I can begin to make good my contention, implicit in the title of 
this paper, that there have been recent advances in metaphysics. Progress has 
certainly been made of late in thinking about how ontological categories may 
be related to one another and, more especially, about which categories might 
have the strongest claim to being «fundamental». What does it mean to describe 
a certain ontological category as being «fundamental»? Just this, I suggest: that 
the existence and identity conditions of entities belonging to that category 
cannot be exhaustively specified in terms of ontological dependency relations 
between those entities and entities belonging to other categories. This is why 
particulars cannot comprise a «fundamental» ontological category if, in fact, 
they are wholly constituted by coinstantiated universals: for in that case, a 
particular exists just in case certain universals are coinstantiated and is 
differentiated from any other particular by the universals which constitute it. In 
point of fact, however, not many contemporary ontologists see much prospect 
in this account of particulars, not least because it implausibly excludes as 
metaphysically impossible a world in which two distinct particulars are 
qualitatively exactly alike –in other words, because it exalts to the status of a 
metaphysically necessary truth an implausibly strong version of Leibniz´s 
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principle of the identity of indiscernibles.8  
I have been getting ahead of myself a little in talking of universals and 
particulars without offering any explicit account of the distinction between 
them. Even in this matter, however, there is controversy. Loosely, it is often said 
that universals are «repeatable» and particulars «non-repeatable» entities. By 
this account, the property of being red, or redness, conceived as a universal, is 
something that may be wholly and repeatedly present at many different times 
and places, whereas a particular red object is wholly confined to a unique space-
time location and cannot «recur» elsewhere and elsewhen.9 There are problems 
with this way of characterising the distinction between universals and 
particulars, but I shall not go into them here. Not surprisingly, however, a good 
many contemporary ontologists would like either to eliminate universals 
altogether from their inventories of existence or else to reduce them to 
particulars. This is the position of so-called trope theorists, for whom properties 
themselves are one and all particulars, with the redness of any one red object 
being numerically distinct from the redness of any other, even if the two objects 
in question resemble each other exactly in respect of their colours. 
Another ontological distinction which requires some explication at this point 
is the distinction between object and property. Although for some ontologists this 
simply coincides with the distinction between particular and universal, clearly it 
does not for trope theorists. Objects are entities which possess, or «bear», 
properties, whereas properties are entities that are possessed, or «borne» by 
objects. Matters are complicated by the fact that properties can themselves 
possess properties, that is, so-called «higher-order properties» –as, for example, 
the property of being red, or redness, has the second-order property of being a 
colour-property. In view of this, one may wish to characterise an «object» more 
precisely as being an entity which bears properties but which is not itself borne 
by anything else. This, however, is one traditional way of characterising the 
category of individual substance –a way that may be found in some of the works of 
Aristotle, for instance.10 
Trope theorists hold that objects, or individual substances, are reducible to 
tropes, that is, to properties conceived as particulars rather than as universals. 
On this view, an object, such as a certain individual flower, is wholly constituted 
by a number of «compresent» tropes: it is, as it were, nothing over and above 
 
8 See further J. van Cleve (1985, pp. 95-107). 
9 See, for example, D. Armstrong (1989, pp. 98-99), and, for an objection, E. J. Lowe (1998, p. 156). 
10 For more on the category of substance, see J. Hoffman and G. S. Rosenkrantz (1994). 
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the particular properties that it possesses, such as a certain colour, shape, size, 
mass and so forth. It is, as they say, a «bundle» of tropes, all of which exist in the 
same place at the same time. Trope theorists advertise as one of the main virtues 
of their theory the fact that it is a «one-category» ontology –meaning by this 
that, according to their theory, there is only one fundamental ontological 
category, that of tropes. Objects, or individual substances, are regarded, as we 
have just seen, as being «bundles» of tropes, depending for their existence and 
identity upon the tropes which constitute them, while universals, if they are 
wanted at all, are reducible to classes of resembling tropes –redness, thus, to the 
class of red tropes. 
I may have given the impression of such a diversity of opinion amongst 
contemporary ontologists as to undermine my own claim that advance has been 
made in modern metaphysics. But advance is not always made simply by arriving 
at a consensus of opinion. Sometimes it is made by the development of new 
theories and healthy argument between their adherents. This, indeed, is what 
very often happens in the empirical sciences too. However, it is time that I 
injected more order into my characterisation of the rival ontological systems 
that are currently under debate. 
To fix nomenclature, if only for the time being, let us operate with the terms 
object, universal and trope. An object is a property-bearing particular which is not 
itself borne by anything else: in traditional terms, it is an individual substance. A 
universal (at least, a first-order universal) is a property conceived as a 
«repeatable» entity, that is, conceived as something that may be borne by many 
different particulars, at different times and places. And a trope is a property 
conceived as a particular, a «non-repeatable» entity that cannot be borne by 
more than one object. Current ontological theories differ both over the 
question of the very existence of entities belonging to these three categories 
and over the question of which of the categories are fundamental. Of the many 
possible positions arising from different combinations of answers to these two 
questions, I shall pick out just four which have received some support in recent 
times. 
First, then, there is the position of the pure trope theorists –such as Keith 
Campbell11– who regard tropes alone as comprising a fundamental category, 
reducing objects to bundles of compresent tropes and universals, if they are 
wanted at all, to classes of resembling tropes. A second position –espoused, for 
 
11 See K. Campbell (1990). See also P. Simons (1994, pp. 553- 75). 
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example, by David Armstrong12– acknowledges both objects and universals as 
comprising fundamental categories, while denying the existence of tropes. A 
third position –one that is currently championed by C. B. Martin13– 
acknowledges both objects and tropes as comprising fundamental categories, 
while denying the existence of universals or, again, reducing them to classes of 
resembling tropes. Unsurprisingly, the fourth position acknowledges all three 
categories of entity –object, universal and trope– as being fundamental, without 
denying, of course, that members of these categories stand in various 
ontologically significant relationships to one another. The distinguishing 











Table 1: Four ontological systems 
Key: F = Fundamental  R = Reduced  E = Eliminated 
 
Before moving on, I want to make special mention of a variant of the fourth 
position which distinguishes between two different but equally fundamental 
categories of universals. This is the position that I favour myself, for reasons that 
I shall outline later. According to this position, there are two fundamental 
categories of particulars –objects and tropes– and two fundamental categories 
of universals: substantial universals, or kinds, whose particular instances are 
objects, and property-universals, whose particular instances are tropes. This is a 
position which some commentators have attributed to Aristotle on the basis of 
passages in his previously mentioned work, the Categories. It has also found some 
other adherents in modern times.14 
 
§4. States of affairs and the truthmaker principle 
At this point we need to reflect on the some of the considerations that motivate 
current debate between the adherents of these different ontological systems. Of 
 
12 See D. Armstrong (1997). 
13 See C. B. Martin (1980, pp. 3-10), and (1993, pp. 505-22). See also C. B. Martin and J. Heil (1999, pp. 34-60). 
14 See, for example, B. Smith (1997, pp. 124-5). 
 Objects Universals Tropes 
1 R E/R F 
2 F F E 
3 F E/R F 
4 F F F 
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the four systems, perhaps the most popular today are pure trope theory on the 
one hand and the two-category ontology of objects and universals on the other. 
Pure trope theory is largely driven, it would seem, by a strong desire for 
ontological economy and a radically empiricist stance in epistemology, inspiring 
frequent appeals to Occam´s razor and a nominalistic hostility to belief in the 
existence of universals. The ontology of objects and universals is motivated at 
least in part by the desire to provide an adequate metaphysical foundation for 
natural science, including most importantly laws of nature. Adherents of this 
ontological system typically hold that laws of nature can properly be understood 
only as consisting in relations between universals. But another important 
driving force in this case is commitment to the so-called truthmaker principle.15 
This is the principle that any true proposition or statement –or, at least, any 
contingently true proposition or statement– must be made true by the existence 
of something appropriate in reality. (I set aside here the question of whether 
propositions or statements, or indeed sentences, are the primary bearers of 
truth and falsehood). 
It is a matter for some debate exactly what «truthmaking» is, but on one 
plausible (if not entirely unproblematic) account of it, a truth-bearer is made 
true by a truthmaker in virtue of the truthmaker´s existence entailing the truth 
of the truth-bearer. In the case of the contingent truth of a simple existential 
proposition, such as the proposition that Mars exists, it will then simply be a 
certain object –in this case, Mars itself– that is the truthmaker. But in the case of 
a contingently true predicative proposition, such as the proposition that Mars is 
red, the truthmaker, it seems, will have to be something in the nature of a fact or 
state of affairs –Mars´s being red– which contains as constituents both an object, 
Mars, and a universal exemplified by that object, redness.16 For the leading 
adherent of this sort of view, states of affairs are the building blocks of reality: 
the world is, in the words of David Armstrong, a world of states of affairs –
recalling the famous opening remarks of Wittgenstein´s Tractatus, «The world is 
everything that is the case ... [it] is the totality of facts, not of things».17 
Saying that states of affairs are the building blocks of reality need not be seen 
as inconsistent with saying that objects and universals are the two fundamental 
 
15 See D. Armstrong (1997, pp. 115 ff). 
16 As Armstrong himself acknowledges, this claim may not seem compelling to believers in tropes, for at least 
some of whom Mars´s particular redness suffices as a truthmaker of the proposition in question. See further, for 
example, K. Mulligan, P. Simons and B. Smith (1984, pp. 287-321) and B. Smith (1999, pp. 274-91). The latter 
paper also highlights some of the difficulties attending a simple entailment account of truth-making. 
17 See D. Armstrong (1997), especially ch. 8. See also L. Wittgenstein (1922). 
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ontological categories. On the view now under discussion, states of affairs are 
constituted by objects and universals, in the sense that these entities are the 
ultimate constituents of states of affairs. At the same time, it is held that objects 
and universals can only exist in combination with one another as constituents of 
states of affairs. Each category of entity may be conceived of as a distinct species 
of invariant across states of affairs. Objects recur in one way in different states of 
affairs, namely, as exemplifying different universals. And universals recur in 
another way in different states of affairs, namely, as being exemplified by 
different objects. Talk of objects «recurring» in this sense is not at odds with 
their being particulars and so «non-repeatable». Their non-repeatability is a 
matter of their not being «wholly present» at different times and places, in the 
way that universals supposedly are. As for states of affairs themselves, they are 
said to be particulars rather than universals, even though they contain 
universals as constituents: Armstrong speaks of this as «the victory of 
particularity».18 
Not all ontologists who recognise the fundamental status of objects and 
universals are equally enamoured of states of affairs, however. They may have 
doubts about the truthmaker principle or, at least, about the reification of states 
of affairs. There are certainly problems about treating facts or states of affairs as 
entities, let alone as the ultimate building blocks of reality. The existence and 
identity conditions of facts are hard to formulate in a trouble-free way. Perhaps 
the best-known problem in this connection is posed by the so-called «Slingshot 
argument», which purports to reduce all facts to one fact, ironically called by 
Donald Davidson «the Great Fact».19 The argument purports to show that, given 
certain allegedly plausible rules of inference, for any two true propositions P 
and Q, the expressions «the fact that P» and «the fact that Q» must have the 
same reference, if they refer to anything at all. The rules stipulate merely that in 
such an expression «P» or «Q» may be replaced, without the expression 
undergoing a change of reference, by any logically equivalent sentence or by 
any sentence in which a referring expression is replaced by another having the 
same reference. I shall not attempt to pass a verdict on the Slingshot argument 
here, but I do believe that it poses a significant challenge to the idea that states 
of affairs can be seen as the building blocks of reality, with objects and 
universals forming their «constituents».20 
 
18 See D. Armstrong (1997, pp. 126-7). 
19 See D. Davidson (1984). For wide-ranging discussion, see S. Neale (1995, pp. 761-825). 
20 See further E. J. Lowe (1998, pp. 241-3). 
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§5. Laws of nature and properties as ways of being 
I mentioned earlier the role that universals are thought by some ontologists to 
play in laws of nature. The issue here is whether laws can be seen as consisting 
in mere uniformities –or, as David Hume might have put it, «constant 
conjunctions»– amongst particulars. For instance, does the law that planets 
move in elliptical orbits –Kepler´s first law– simply amount to the fact that each 
and every individual planet moves in such an orbit? (I do not necessarily mean 
talk of a «fact» here to carry any ontological weight: one may, if one is 
suspicious of facts, reconstrue what is said in terms of the truth of a 
proposition). One apparent problem with such a suggestion is that not every 
individual planet does so move, because some –indeed, in reality, all– are 
subject to interference by the gravitational attraction of other bodies besides 
the star which they are orbiting. 
More seriously still, the suggestion renders inexplicable our conviction that 
statements of natural law entail (or at least support) corresponding 
counterfactual conditionals. We want to say that if an actually planetless star had 
had a planet, then that planet would have moved in an elliptical orbit: but this 
cannot be entailed by the fact that each and every actually existing planet moves 
in an elliptical orbit. The answer to this problem, it is urged, is to say that the 
law consists in a relation between two universals, the property of being a planet 
and the property of moving in an elliptical orbit –a relation of «necessitation» 
which constrains any particular exemplifying the first property to exemplify the 
second as well.21 For this constraint will apply not just in the actual world, but in 
any counterfactual situation –any possible world– in which those properties are 
related in the same way as they are in the actual world, and thus in any possible 
world in which the law in question obtains. The pure trope theorist, in denying 
universals, is apparently committed to a «constant conjunction» conception of 
laws, as is the advocate of an ontology admitting only objects and tropes as 
fundamental entities.  
In another respect, however, an advocate of the latter sort of ontology can to 
some extent find common cause with the advocate of universals on the matter 
of property-bearing. For the pure trope theorist, individual objects are just 
«bundles» of «compresent» –that is, spatiotemporally coinciding– tropes. 
However, this seems to grant to tropes a kind of ontological independence 
 
21 See David Armstrong (1983b, p. 85). 
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which they plausibly cannot have. It is not clear, on this view, why the tropes in 
any given bundle should not separate from one another and either float free of 
other tropes altogether or migrate to other trope-bundles. It has seemed better 
to many ontologists to conceive of properties –whether they be regarded as 
universals or as particulars– as ways objects are.22 An object´s redness, thus, is its 
way of being coloured and its roundness, say, is its way of being shaped. If one 
thinks that different objects may literally be coloured or shaped in the very same 
way –that is, in numerically the same way– then one is thinking of these «ways» 
as universals. Otherwise, one is thinking of them as trope-like entities –
particular «ways», or, to revert to a more traditional terminology, modes. 
Opponents of pure trope theory will say that it makes no sense to suppose that 
an object –something that has properties such as redness and roundness– can 
just be constituted by those very properties, being nothing over and above the 
sum of its properties. To suppose this is, they will say, quite literally to make a 
«category mistake». It is to confuse an object´s properties with its parts: for the 
parts of an object, if it has any, are themselves objects, with properties of their 
own.23  
In reply, the trope theorist may challenge opponents to say what more there is 
or can be to an object than the properties that it bears. This is a dangerous 
question for the opponents of trope theory, for they may be tempted to say that 
objects do indeed possess an additional «ingredient» or «constituent», over and 
above the properties that they bear, characterising this additional constituent as 
a «substratum» or «bare particular» –that is, an entity which is not itself a 
property, nor yet a propertied object, but a constituent of an object which plays 
the role of «bearing» that object´s properties.24 In my view, those who go down 
this road make the mistake of conceding in the first place that an object´s 
properties are «constituents» of the object. For it was this move that committed 
them to finding some further «constituent» of an object once they denied the 
trope theorist´s contention that an object is wholly constituted by its properties. 
The proper thing to do, I suggest, is just to emphasise again that an object´s 
properties are ways it is and say that the object itself is the «bearer» of its 
properties, not some mythical «constituent» of the object that is somehow 
buried within it and inescapably hidden from view. 
Suppose we accept that universals must be included in our ontology as 
 
22 See J. Levinson (1978, pp. 1- 22). 
23 See C. B. Martin (1980), for such a criticism. Other philosophers, however, contend that tropes are indeed parts 
of objects, but dependent rather than independent parts. 
24 I criticise this view in E. J. Lowe (2000, pp. 499-514). 
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fundamental in order to account for the ontological status of natural laws and 
accept too that individual objects comprise a fundamental category of entities, 
irreducible to their properties, whether the latter are conceived as universals or 
as particulars. What is to be said for including properties both as universals and 
as particulars in our ontology? Mainly this, I think: it seems that only particulars 
can participate in causal relationships and that an object participates in such 
relationships in different ways according to its different properties. Thus, it is a 
rock´s mass that explains the depth of the depression it makes upon falling on 
to soft earth, whereas it is the rock´s shape that explains the shape of the 
depression. Perception itself involves a causal relationship between the 
perceiver and the object perceived and we perceive an object by perceiving at 
least some of its properties –we perceive, for instance, a flower´s colour and 
smell. But this seems to require that what we thus perceive are items that are 
unique to the object in question– this flower´s redness and sweetness, say, as 
opposed to a universal redness and sweetness that are also exemplified by other, 
exactly resembling flowers.25 For, surely, in seeing and smelling this flower, I 
cannot be said to perceive the colour and smell of any other flower. 
The only response to this last point that seems available to the opponent of 
properties conceived as particulars is to say that what I see and smell in such a 
case is not, literally, the redness and sweetness of the flower as such, these 
allegedly being universals, but, rather, the fact that the flower is red and the fact 
that it is sweet, these facts being construed as particulars which enter into causal 
relations when perception occurs. But this then saddles us again with an 
ontology of facts or states of affairs, which we have seen to be open to objection. 
 
§6. The four-category ontology 
If the foregoing diagnosis is correct, we should gravitate towards the fourth 
system of ontology identified earlier, the system which acknowledges three 
distinct ontological categories as being fundamental and indispensable –the 
category of objects, or individual substances; the category of universals; and the 
category of tropes, or, as I shall henceforth prefer to call them, modes. It is then 
but a short step to my own variant of this system, which distinguishes between 
two fundamental categories of universal, one whose instances are objects and 
the other whose instances are modes. This distinction is mirrored in language 
by the distinction between sortal and adjectival general terms –that is, between 
such general terms as «planet» and «flower» on the one hand and such general 
 
25 See further E. J. Lowe (1998, p. 205). 
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terms as «red» and «round» on the other.26 The former denote kinds of object, 
while the latter denote properties of objects. Individual objects are particular 
instances of kinds, while the modes of individual objects are particular instances 
of properties. If a distinctive term is wanted to speak of properties thus 
conceived as universals, the term attribute will serve, though in what follows I 
shall for the most part either allow context to eliminate any ambiguity or else 
speak explicitly of property-universals. I believe that this system of ontology has 
a number of advantages over all of its rivals, a few of which I shall briefly sketch 
now. 
The four-category ontology –as I like to call it– provides, I believe, a uniquely 
satisfactory metaphysical foundation for natural science.27 It can, for instance, 
account for the ontological status of natural laws by regarding them as involving 
universals, but not simply property-universals. Rather, laws typically involve both 
kinds and either properties or relations. Take, for example, the law that I 
expressed earlier by means of the law-statement «Planets move in elliptical 
orbits». According to the most popular current view of laws as involving 
universals –the view championed by David Armstrong– this law consists in the 
fact that a second-order relation of necessitation obtains between the first-order 
properties of being a planet and moving in an elliptical orbit. I say, rather, that 
the law consists in the fact that the property of moving in an elliptical orbit 
characterizes the kind planet. In this way, I both obviate the need to appeal to 
any second-order relation and provide an account of the ontological status of 
laws which more closely reflects the syntactical structure of law-statements. For, 
as I have pointed out elsewhere, the standard form of law-statements in natural 
language is that of dispositional predications with natural kind terms in subject-
position, other examples being «Gold is fusible», «Electrons are negatively 
charged» and «Mammals are warm-blooded».28 Notice, in this connection, that 
the predicate in «Planets move in elliptical orbits» is clearly dispositional in 
force: the law-statement is an expression of how planets are disposed to move, 
under the gravitational influence of a star. And this, indeed, is why such a law-
statement is not falsified by the fact that the actual movements of planets often 
deviate from the elliptical orbits in which they would move if they were not 
subject to interference by the gravitational forces exerted by other planets. I 
 
26 See further E. J. Lowe (1989), ch. 2. 
27 I first introduced this name for the present ontological system in E. J. Lowe (1998, pp. 203-4). Many of the 
points that follow are developed in more detail in the following papers: E. J. Lowe (2001, pp. 5-23), (2002d, pp. 
137-150), (2002b, pp. 189-206), and (2002a, pp. 225-40). 
28 See my E. J. Lowe (1989) ch. 8. 
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should add that some laws are genuinely relational, such as the law that 
electrons and protons attract one another: but here the relation is not one in 
which only universals can stand to one another, so it is not in that sense a 
«second-order» relation, like the relation of «necessitation» invoked by the rival 
universalist account of laws. 
Next, the four-category ontology can account for the distinction between 
dispositional and occurrent (or «categorical») states of objects –between, for 
instance, an object´s being fusible and its actually melting, or between an 
object´s being soluble and its actually dissolving. Various other accounts of this 
distinction have been offered recently by metaphysicians, none of which, in my 
view, is entirely satisfactory. Attempts to analyse disposition statements in terms 
of counterfactual conditionals all founder on the fact that the manifestation of 
a disposition can always be inhibited or prevented by interfering factors.29 Thus, 
for example, «O is water-soluble» cannot be analysed as «If O were immersed in 
water, then O would be dissolving», nor can the antecedent of this 
counterfactual be expanded by any finite list of specifiable additional 
conditions in a way which will secure its logical equivalence with the original 
disposition statement. Merely adding the catch-all ceteris paribus condition that 
«all other things are equal», or «nothing interferes», simply serves to trivialise 
the proposed analysis. 
According to the four-category ontology, the distinction between dispositional 
and occurrent states of objects may be explained in the following way. An object 
possesses a disposition to F just in case it instantiates a kind which is characterized 
by the property of being F. Thus, for example, an object O has a disposition to 
be dissolved by water just in case O instantiates a kind, K, such that the law 
obtains that water dissolves K. Here, K might be, say, the kind sodium chloride and 
the law, correspondingly, the law that water dissolves sodium chloride. As we 
have already seen, by my account of laws, laws themselves are dispositional in 
force. And, indeed, this is borne out in the present case by the fact that the law 
just stated can be equally well expressed by the sentence «sodium chloride is 
water-soluble». On the other hand, an object is occurrently F just in case it 
possesses a mode which is an instance of the property of being F, that is, a mode 
of the universal Fness. To apply this sort of analysis to the case of an object O´s 
occurrently being dissolved by some water, we merely need to invoke relational 
modes, whereupon we can analyse this occurrent state as obtaining just in case 
O and some water are related by a mode which is an instance of the universal 
 
29 See C. B. Martin (1994, pp. 1-8). 
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relation of dissolution. By the account of laws which I favour, it is, of course, the 
fact that this same universal relation holds between the kinds water and sodium 
chloride that constitutes the law that water dissolves sodium chloride. Thus it 
emerges that the distinction between the dispositional and the occurrent simply 
reflects, ultimately, the ontological distinction between the domain of universals 
and the domain of particulars. 
Combining this observation with my earlier remarks about perception, we can 
now understand why it is that an object´s occurrent states are perceptible but its 
dispositions are not. For what we can perceive of an object are its modes –its 
particular «ways of being»– and it is in virtue of possessing these that the object is 
in various occurrent states, say of melting or dissolving. By contrast, the object is 
in various dispositional states in virtue of instantiating kinds which are 
characterised by various property-universals, that is, kinds which are subject to 
various laws –and this is not the sort of circumstance that perception can 
acquaint us with directly (although, of course, it can provide empirical evidence 
for it). 
The four-category ontology has no difficulty in saying what «ties together» the 
particular properties –that is, the modes– of an object. An object´s modes are 
simply «particular ways it is»: they are characteristics, or features, or aspects of 
the object, rather than constituents of it. If properties were constituents of an 
object, they would need, no doubt, to be tied together somehow, either very 
loosely by coexisting in the same place at the same time, or more tightly by 
depending in some mysterious way either upon each other or upon some still 
more mysterious «substratum», conceived as a further constituent of the object, 
distinct from any of its properties. It is precisely because a mode is a particular 
way this or that particular object is that modes cannot «float free» or «migrate» 
from one object to another –circumstances that pure trope theorists seem 
obliged to countenance as being at least metaphysically possible. Moreover, the 
four-category ontology allows us to say that the properties of a kind are tied to it, 
in the laws to which it is subject, in a manner which entirely parallels, at the 
level of universals, the way in which an individual object´s modes are tied to that 
object. In both cases, the tie is simply a matter of the «characterization» of a 
propertied entity by its various properties and consists in the fact that the 
properties are «ways» the propertied entity is. 
Fig. 2 below may help to highlight the main structural features of the four-
category ontology as I have just outlined it. I shall return to it (or slightly 
modified versions of it) frequently in later chapters of  my book, The Four-
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Category Ontology, where —in deference to tradition— I shall call it «the 
Ontological Square». In this diagram I use the term «attribute», as suggested 
earlier, to denote the category of property– universals and, for simplicity of 
presentation, I am ignoring relational universals. An object O may exemplify an 
attribute A in either of two ways. O may instantiate a kind K which is 
characterised by A, in which case O exemplifies A dispositionally. Alternatively, O 
may be characterised by a mode M which instantiates A, in which case O 
exemplifies A occurrently. 
 
 
Fig. 2: The four-category ontology30 
 
It may perhaps be doubted whether the four-category ontology provides an 
adequate metaphysical foundation for the more esoteric reaches of modern 
physics, such as the general theory of relativity and quantum physics. But I 
believe that even here it will serve well enough. The examples of «objects», 
«kinds», «attributes» and «modes» that I have so far utilized have been for the 
most part fairly familiar and mundane ones. But nothing hinders us from 
saying, if need be, that relativistic space-time has the status of an individual 
substance or object, with the consequence, perhaps, that the entities that we are 
ordinarily apt to regard as objects –such as material bodies– are «really» just 
spatiotemporally continuous successions of space-time modes. This is a view of 
 
30 See also E. J. Lowe (2011, pp. 109-126) and (2012b, p. 98) to updated version «The Ontological Square». 
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the material world which, indeed, is prefigured in the metaphysical system of 
Spinoza. Again, we need not take a stand on the issue of whether the ontology 
of quantum physics is best construed in a way which treats quantum entities as 
particles –a kind of object– or as modes of a quantised field. Either way, the 
four-category ontology will admit of application. 
It is important to stress, then, that metaphysics should not be in the business 
of dictating to empirical scientists precisely how they should categorise the 
theoretical entities whose existence they postulate. Metaphysics supplies the 
categories, but how best to apply them in the construction of specific scientific 
theories is a matter best left to the theorists themselves, provided that they 
respect the constraints which the categorial framework imposes. So long as the 
empirical sciences invoke laws for explanatory purposes and appeal to 
perception for empirical evidence, the four-category ontology31 will, I believe, 
adequately serve as a metaphysical framework for the scientific enterprise. That 
some metaphysical framework is necessary for the success of that enterprise and 
that its formulation is not the business of any special science, but only that of 
the general science of being, or ontology, I hope to be by now beyond dispute. 
  
 
31 See further E. J. Lowe (2003, pp. 75-95), (2009a, pp. 28-36), (2009b), (2012a, pp. 23-48), (2013, pp. 338-57), 
especially (2006), (2012b, pp. 93-111) and (2011, pp. 109-126), where many of the points made in this paper 
receive a fuller and updated treatment. 
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